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@gbj_tester
Your evidence for this is what? Look at crime and punishment; the deterrent effect of punishment is negligible, because crooks are usually stupid enough to think they won't get caught. Demonstrating that they will get caught by good enforcement has a greater deterrent effect than any variation in the level of punishment they will receive when they do get caught.
There are economics in play when criminality is highly profitable, which is why LA was acting rationally even though he was also acting immorally; there was (and probably still is) a perverse incentive in the rules which made it economically rational to cheat even if he thought there was a high probability of eventual capture, because there was (and still is) no effective procedure for recovering the proceeds of crime. In financial crime circles, there is a move towards deferred bonuses, and there might be an argument for some comparable measures in cycling, but simply postponing payments would disproportionately punish the innocent, and at the lower levels even of the ProTour peloton riders simply wouldn't turn up if any significant portion of their salary was subject to claw-back. At the top level, where the really big money comes not from team salary or prize money but from endorsement and image rights, the arrangements are a matter of private contract between the rider and the sponsor, which are not really any of the UCI's business. Of course, the right wing nutter in my house thinks salary and prizes are none of the UCI's business either, leaving all contractual terms relating to compensating the money providers for reputational damage resulting from riders' rule breaking to the market.