Comments on rules / refs I sent to NA Hardcourt

I find this particular statement laughable considering how often you tout yourself as the dirtiest player in London.

Make up your mind. Do you want refs so that you can be chastised by them when you continue playing how you do, or are you suddenly going to start playing within the rules once we disallow bike to bike as per your above criteria?

Honestly, I don't consider myself the dirtiest player in London. Or at least, no more or less dirty than most. Your view of my play might be different.

I don't want to be singled out by refs - I just want to play fair, and be played fair.

I have been reading some books on behavioural economics and behavioural psychology and a lot of it is influenced by game theory. I don't know if you are familiar with game theory, but the classic game theory puzzle / paradigm 'the prisoner's dilemma':
[INDENT]
In its classical form, the prisoner's dilemma ("PD") is presented as follows:
Two suspects are arrested by the police. The police have insufficient evidence for a conviction, and, having separated both prisoners, visit each of them to offer the same deal. If one testifies (defects from the other) for the prosecution against the other and the other remains silent (cooperates with the other), the betrayer goes free and the silent accomplice receives the full 10-year sentence. If both remain silent, both prisoners are sentenced to only six months in jail for a minor charge. If each betrays the other, each receives a five-year sentence. Each prisoner must choose to betray the other or to remain silent. Each one is assured that the other would not know about the betrayal before the end of the investigation. How should the prisoners act?

If we assume that each player cares only about minimizing his or her own time in jail, then the prisoner's dilemma forms a non-zero-sum game in which two players may each cooperate with or defect from (betray) the other player. In this game, as in most game theory, the only concern of each individual player (prisoner) is maximizing his or her own payoff, without any concern for the other player's payoff. The unique equilibrium for this game is a Pareto-suboptimal solution, that is, rational choice leads the two players to both play defect, even though each player's individual reward would be greater if they both played cooperatively.

In the classic form of this game, cooperating is strictly dominated by defecting, so that the only possible equilibrium for the game is for all players to defect. No matter what the other player does, one player will always gain a greater payoff by playing defect. Since in any situation playing defect is more beneficial than cooperating, all rational players will play defect, all things being equal.[/INDENT]

If you substitute cheating for defecting, you have the polo player's dilemma.