New edgy thread

I would replace your second definition with:

Sound is the sensation experienced by a (healthy, normal) subject when its ear drums vibrate (say).

So a scientist would be inclined to say: there is no sound in the second sense if the tree falls and there is no one around with ear drums to rattle and have sensations, but that seems just trivially built in to this definition of sound. The idea of a sensation of sound has no explanatory force.

If we want to built into our definition of 'sound' an 'explanatory force' then there is nothing stopping us - but whatever definition we decide on - when entered into the blank spaces in the question (where to word 'sound' once was) - will answer that question.

So the question normally runs:

If a tree falls and no one is around to hear it, does it make a sound.

Now let's suppose we define sound as the propagation of sound pressure waves through the medium of air.

The question now runs:

If a tree falls and no one is around to heat it, does it propagate sound pressure waves through the medium of air.

The question has now become a simple matter of inductive reasoning and suggests it is reasonable to suppose that if a tree falls and no one is around to hear it, it does propagate sound pressure waves through the medium of air (it does make a 'sound').

Now if you factor in your need for an explanatory force (or any other considerations) then use that definition in place of the word sound, then once again the question becomes a simple matter (rather than some profound and mystical puzzle). Unless of course this new definition (that includes an explanatory force in this particular example) tries to pull the same trick and obfuscate certain terms (creating what I will term compounded pseudo-profundity :P ) in which case the same act of forcing a definition of the equivocal words is brought into play.

Whichever way it goes it will be a case of definitions, making clear what it meant by the terms used, it is still just a language trick.

And if you start from the position that there is a knowable, objective, physical world that has physical 'subjects' (us) living in it, that is a sensible view.

I do.

But Berkeley was starting from the position that the only things each of us really knows first hand are our sense perceptions, our ideas; and everything we might think we know about a material world is ultimately derived from them.

Of course ! What else could there be ?

We have no first-hand knowledge of the material world, and if we're strict with ourselves, we should, as he does, deny that it exists at all.

Of course we have first-hand knowledge of the material world, the material world is that thing that interacts with our senses, again what else could there be, what other kind of first-hand knowledge is there ?

So the second definition of sound takes massive precedence over the first in his way of thinking, precisely because it starts out from what he thinks each of knows for sure exists - our own sense data.

He seems to be arbitrarily making a distinction between the 'outside' word and the 'inner' word. Simple thought experiments (which I am sure you are more than capable of rustling up) could show us how sense from our ear drums or nerve endings are no more part of us (or the 'outside') than the texture of tree bark.

The problem is, if there are only ideas, as he thinks, how can it be that some idea-things, such as places, people, trees, can disappear from view or earshot then re-appear as if they had continued to exist in some sense in the mean time, outside my mind, possibly outside of everyone's mind?

Well I don't subscribe to his whimsical metaphysics, but I can help him out here - the things such as places, people, trees are also ideas. (Just to make clear, I don't agree with this idea, but if I read this right - his problem of contingency doesn't look like a problem at all ? Ideas can come and go.

This reminds me of an argument made against solipsism that ran something to the effect:

If the solipsist is right and they are all that exist, then take a look at the sheer arrogance of their position, they have dreamt up all the languages in the word, discovered the germ theory of disease, mastered and applied quantum physics, designed all the cars in the word, painted all the paintings, written all the books and so on . . . .

Which I thought was a stupid argument as the solipsist only has to imagine these things exist, they don't have to actually exist. I hope you can see how that ties in with your point here.

How can that tree falling in the forest make a noise if no one is around to hear it? That's where God comes in.

Now that is just silly. :)

We are back to definitions. The term 'god' doesn't actually mean anything, it's a placeholder for 'something or other' or 'I don't know' or any old word you want put in it's place, there is no cogent internally consistent definition, it's a silly meaningless nonsense term. You may as well say: "How can that tree falling in the forest make a noise if no one is around to hear it ? That's where ؍∆♟♆✤✏ comes in".

You really have to entertain this view of the world in all its nutty glory to get past the idea that the falling tree question is just a matter of definition - and I'm not saying that you should!

I suspect this Berkeley bloke was a lesbo.