New edgy thread

Mr Tynan, how many dimensions are there?

My point is that Berkeley has a serious reason for defining sound in that way for his purposes, and that makes it not just a matter of definition. He's interested in how we get from the things that are available to sense experience to things that aren't, and he is genuinely concerned about that. It's not as if it is in any way part of common sense to define 'sound' as anything other than something dependent on our senses.

Agreed, and I see what you are saying, but science doesn't deal with commonsense, it that reasonable ?

Without drifting too far down some philosophical backwater, when it comes back to the pseudo profundity of "if a tree falls and no one is there - does it make a sound" - from what I can see Berkeley (who is probably a racist) would answer 'no' - and he would give this answer on the foundation of his definition of sound (as you outlined above) - so I still maintain that the question "if a tree falls and no one is there - does it make a sound" is a matter of definition and not a puzzling philosophical conundrum, mere semantic trickery - that is not to take anything away from what this fella' Berkeley puts forward.

And pedantry or no pedantry, the claim that the sound we hear is caused by the dissipation of pressure waves is a hypothesis and not a theory worthy of the name.

Get out of here !? :)

I haven't looked it up (out of laziness) but surely the idea that sound propagates though a medium is well established as a theory and not still languishing as a hypothesis !! Surely !

Mr Tynan, how many dimensions are there?

I haven't got a clue.

How are you using the word dimension ?

Mr Tynan, how many dimensions are there?

I haven't got a clue.

How are you using the word dimension ?

Mr Tynan, how many dimensions are there?

I haven't got a clue.

How are you using the word dimension ?

An easy chart to help out.

Or, if you prefer...

EDIT . . . .

And pedantry or no pedantry, the claim that the sound we hear is caused by the dissipation of pressure waves is a hypothesis and not a theory worthy of the name.

*Get out of here !? :)

I haven't looked it up (out of laziness) but surely the idea that sound propagates though a medium is well established as a theory and not still languishing as a hypothesis !! Surely !*

I thought I hadn't gone completely mad, the notion of sound propogating through a medium is covered by the wave theory of sound - which is of course a theory not a hypothesis.

i just wiki'd Time. wooooooweee.

and in doing so, i read about dimensions, circularity of definition (i might have been guilty of this today), fundamental qualities, the SI system of units, Sevres, the universe, sequence, realist, and times arrow. so much i dont know. and too much for a sunday eve. g night

i just wiki'd Time. wooooooweee.

and in doing so, i read about dimensions, circularity of definition (i might have been guilty of this today), fundamental qualities, the SI system of units, Sevres, the universe, sequence, realist, and times arrow. so much i dont know. and too much for a sunday eve. g night

'Times arrow' is a good one to put you off your dinner, there appears to be no reason why we remember the past and not the future. Physics in particular does not rely on times arrow.

EDIT
*Get out of here !? :)

I haven't looked it up (out of laziness) but surely the idea that sound propagates though a medium is well established as a theory and not still languishing as a hypothesis !! Surely !*

I thought I hadn't gone completely mad, the notion of sound propogating through a medium is covered by the wave theory of sound - which is of course a theory not a hypothesis.

We're talking at cross purposes. You're talking about the scientific theory of sound; I'm talking about the philosophical leap from the subjective, heard sound, to its supposed origins in physical perturbations, which I maintain is a hypothesis, although it's not a particularly scientific or testable hypothesis, granted. It is, though, the hypothesis that Berkeley is grappling with.

Berkeley's answer to the question of whether the tree makes the sound if no one hears is it is that it does make a sound because God hears it and God is always around to hear everything - but then he was a clergyman, a bishop at that. This might be a good time for me to say that I am in no way defending Berkeley's position, just making a case for the validity of his concerns about how we come to know about the physical world.

This isn't just an ancient worry that physicists have moved on from entirely. There's a lot of this kind of agonising about reality and observation in Eddington, the bloke who demonstrated that Einstein's theory of relativity held water.

I haven't got a clue.

How are you using the word dimension ?

There are 26.

I have never seen that apparent conunrum as anything more that an issue with defining terms.

If, before you pose the question, you tell me what you mean by sound, then the question asnswers itself.

If - for example - you define sound as a vibration of the air falling on your ears and then being electrochemically (through nerve impulses) translated into the abstract we call sound in our brains, then of course if there is no one there then there is no sound.

If- on the other hand - you define sound as the dissipation of pressure waves through a medium such as water or air - then regradless of whether there is anyone there the dissipation of pressure waves through air happens, thus sound (as defined) happens.

The question is not a profundity, it is sophistry and equivocation, it is a trick question that relies on the equivocation of the word 'sound'.

You know that bit at the end of The Matrix, when Neo gets all angsty on Agent Smith and then flexes in the corridor and the corridor flexes with him? Then Morpheus suddenly has that wonderful epiphany, and says "He is the one".

That's what I feel like every time I read something written by Tynan.

We're talking at cross purposes. You're talking about the scientific theory of sound; I'm talking about the philosophical leap from the subjective, heard sound, to its supposed origins in physical perturbations, which I maintain is a hypothesis, although it's not a particularly scientific or testable hypothesis, granted. It is, though, the hypothesis that Berkeley is grappling with.

Ah I see ! yes, everything is up for grabs epistemologically, everything is questionable, always, agreed.

But "I think therefore I am" (or whatever Mr D said) comes to mind - - - agree ?

This isn't just an ancient worry that physicists have moved on from entirely.

Not sure I agree, I could take that question, blank out the word 'sound' (or related words) and ask you to fill in the blanks, and the question would become axiomatic.

I could be wrong of course but I have never seen it as anything other than equivocation, I am sure you can attach interesting (and worthy/good/true) ideas onto the conceit - but the central question is a scientific question.

When the tree falls - is sound produced if no one there to hear it.

Define sound:

Sound is the air vibrating - then yes the air will vibrate whether someone is there or not, in that respect sound is produced.

Sound is your ear drums vibrating - then if you are not there and your ear drums do not vibrate then no sound is produced.

You know that bit at the end of The Matrix, when Neo gets all angsty on Agent Smith and then flexes in the corridor and the corridor flexes with him? Then Morpheus suddenly has that wonderful epiphany, and says "He is the one".

That's what I feel like every time I read something written by Tynan.

racist and possible lesbo

I have not read the whole thread but in response to the OP I would say mostly good.

I've always thought an infinite universe is impossible because anything that can possibly happen will happen, and must have happened if the universe is truly infinite. Obviously that depends on if you believe an infinite amount of space will create an infinite amount of possibilities.

What I mean is, for example, you could think that an infinite universe means an infinite possible occurrence of events that create Earth. If Earth was created (I'm not talking religion), then it is physically possible in the universe, so it must have happened an infinite amount of times, because the universe is infinite in size. And on from that, there's an infinite number of humans just like us, and infinite number of humans similar to us in varying stages of evolution. There must be an Earth out there that still has dinosaurs on it. There must be an Earth where dinosaurs and humans live together...

Ah I see ! yes, everything is up for grabs epistemologically, everything is questionable, always, agreed.

But "I think therefore I am" (or whatever Mr D said) comes to mind - - - agree ?

Yes, another attempt at a solution to the same epistemological conundrum, Descartes thought there was a material world as well as a mental world; Berkeley thought there was only mental stuff, our ideas and ideas in the mind of God.

Not sure I agree, I could take that question, blank out the word 'sound' (or related words) and ask you to fill in the blanks, and the question would become axiomatic.

I could be wrong of course but I have never seen it as anything other than equivocation, I am sure you can attach interesting (and worthy/good/true) ideas onto the conceit - but the central question is a scientific question.

When the tree falls - is sound produced if no one there to hear it.

Define sound:

Sound is the air vibrating - then yes the air will vibrate whether someone is there or not, in that respect sound is produced.

Sound is your ear drums vibrating - then if you are not there and your ear drums do not vibrate then no sound is produced.

I would replace your second definition with:

Sound is the sensation experienced by a (healthy, normal) subject when its ear drums vibrate (say).

So a scientist would be inclined to say: there is no sound in the second sense if the tree falls and there is no one around with ear drums to rattle and have sensations, but that seems just trivially built in to this definition of sound. The idea of a sensation of sound has no explanatory force.

And if you start from the position that there is a knowable, objective, physical world that has physical 'subjects' (us) living in it, that is a sensible view.

But Berkeley was starting from the position that the only things each of us really knows first hand are our sense perceptions, our ideas; and everything we might think we know about a material world is ultimately derived from them. We have no first-hand knowledge of the material world, and if we're strict with ourselves, we should, as he does, deny that it exists at all. So the second definition of sound takes massive precedence over the first in his way of thinking, precisely because it starts out from what he thinks each of knows for sure exists - our own sense data.

The problem is, if there are only ideas, as he thinks, how can it be that some idea-things, such as places, people, trees, can disappear from view or earshot then re-appear as if they had continued to exist in some sense in the mean time, outside my mind, possibly outside of everyone's mind? How can that tree falling in the forest make a noise if no one is around to hear it? That's where God comes in.

You really have to entertain this view of the world in all its nutty glory to get past the idea that the falling tree question is just a matter of definition - and I'm not saying that you should!

I would replace your second definition with:

Sound is the sensation experienced by a (healthy, normal) subject when its ear drums vibrate (say).

So a scientist would be inclined to say: there is no sound in the second sense if the tree falls and there is no one around with ear drums to rattle and have sensations, but that seems just trivially built in to this definition of sound. The idea of a sensation of sound has no explanatory force.

If we want to built into our definition of 'sound' an 'explanatory force' then there is nothing stopping us - but whatever definition we decide on - when entered into the blank spaces in the question (where to word 'sound' once was) - will answer that question.

So the question normally runs:

If a tree falls and no one is around to hear it, does it make a sound.

Now let's suppose we define sound as the propagation of sound pressure waves through the medium of air.

The question now runs:

If a tree falls and no one is around to heat it, does it propagate sound pressure waves through the medium of air.

The question has now become a simple matter of inductive reasoning and suggests it is reasonable to suppose that if a tree falls and no one is around to hear it, it does propagate sound pressure waves through the medium of air (it does make a 'sound').

Now if you factor in your need for an explanatory force (or any other considerations) then use that definition in place of the word sound, then once again the question becomes a simple matter (rather than some profound and mystical puzzle). Unless of course this new definition (that includes an explanatory force in this particular example) tries to pull the same trick and obfuscate certain terms (creating what I will term compounded pseudo-profundity :P ) in which case the same act of forcing a definition of the equivocal words is brought into play.

Whichever way it goes it will be a case of definitions, making clear what it meant by the terms used, it is still just a language trick.

And if you start from the position that there is a knowable, objective, physical world that has physical 'subjects' (us) living in it, that is a sensible view.

I do.

But Berkeley was starting from the position that the only things each of us really knows first hand are our sense perceptions, our ideas; and everything we might think we know about a material world is ultimately derived from them.

Of course ! What else could there be ?

We have no first-hand knowledge of the material world, and if we're strict with ourselves, we should, as he does, deny that it exists at all.

Of course we have first-hand knowledge of the material world, the material world is that thing that interacts with our senses, again what else could there be, what other kind of first-hand knowledge is there ?

So the second definition of sound takes massive precedence over the first in his way of thinking, precisely because it starts out from what he thinks each of knows for sure exists - our own sense data.

He seems to be arbitrarily making a distinction between the 'outside' word and the 'inner' word. Simple thought experiments (which I am sure you are more than capable of rustling up) could show us how sense from our ear drums or nerve endings are no more part of us (or the 'outside') than the texture of tree bark.

The problem is, if there are only ideas, as he thinks, how can it be that some idea-things, such as places, people, trees, can disappear from view or earshot then re-appear as if they had continued to exist in some sense in the mean time, outside my mind, possibly outside of everyone's mind?

Well I don't subscribe to his whimsical metaphysics, but I can help him out here - the things such as places, people, trees are also ideas. (Just to make clear, I don't agree with this idea, but if I read this right - his problem of contingency doesn't look like a problem at all ? Ideas can come and go.

This reminds me of an argument made against solipsism that ran something to the effect:

If the solipsist is right and they are all that exist, then take a look at the sheer arrogance of their position, they have dreamt up all the languages in the word, discovered the germ theory of disease, mastered and applied quantum physics, designed all the cars in the word, painted all the paintings, written all the books and so on . . . .

Which I thought was a stupid argument as the solipsist only has to imagine these things exist, they don't have to actually exist. I hope you can see how that ties in with your point here.

How can that tree falling in the forest make a noise if no one is around to hear it? That's where God comes in.

Now that is just silly. :)

We are back to definitions. The term 'god' doesn't actually mean anything, it's a placeholder for 'something or other' or 'I don't know' or any old word you want put in it's place, there is no cogent internally consistent definition, it's a silly meaningless nonsense term. You may as well say: "How can that tree falling in the forest make a noise if no one is around to hear it ? That's where ؍∆♟♆✤✏ comes in".

You really have to entertain this view of the world in all its nutty glory to get past the idea that the falling tree question is just a matter of definition - and I'm not saying that you should!

I suspect this Berkeley bloke was a lesbo.

He was an Irish lesbo racist idealist.

Win

Win

Your win has no currency here.

Win

How are you using the word 'win'.

Do you mean 'lose' ?

:P

(ER-IYCY)

FUcking hell now the cuntng fucking euroshit website's failing. Deaath to all

FUcking hell now the cuntng fucking euroshit website's failing. Deaath to all

How are you using the word 'euroshit' ?