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  • Israel doesn't know whether using more force on Palestine will prevent attacks from Hamas or provoke them

    History tells us the answer to this. Extremism thrives off violence. Hamas is arguably only extant due to discontent with previous overuse of force by Israel, and the perceived subsequent lack of action by Fatah.
    Elsewhere it is evident that increased strength of resistance has been shown in face of increasing violence.
    Afghanistan (Britain)
    Vietnam (France, then Japan, then France, then America)
    Afghanistan (USSR)
    Iraq (Britain and America)
    Afghanistan (Americans and British)

    Hamas don't know what the reaction will be to an attack - they can guess it will provoke a violent reaction, but how far, and what will the international reaction be?

    They absolutely did know, and they knew the extent. They knew that Israel would retaliate, as it always has done and has made Policy, with an Iron Fist, and this would lead to substantial, unavoidable, civilian casualties of Palestinians.
    This makes the already abhorrent action taken by Hamas even more abhorrent.
    As to the international reaction- they don't care. They're zealots.

    Violence doesn't work. One of the Intifadas had a set focus of following India and Gandhi's noncooperative nonviolent, though was inevitably co-opted by other elements.
    Success was made on an international stage as well as within Israel, just as with India, and this has been lost to history in favour of bloody-minded violent means.

  • They absolutely did know, and they knew the extent

    They can guess there will be a reaction by Israel, but can they guess how the international community will react to that, both in the West and the Middle East? Which other countries might get caught up in the reaction or otherwise become involved?

    Equally, I don't think this is straightforward:

    Extremism thrives off violence. Hamas is arguably only extant due to discontent with previous overuse of force by Israel

    2 reasons - 1. Now we are where we are, Israel ceasing to use any force doesn't remove the threat - people have long memories, and Israel doesn't know (given all the history) whether it leaves itself exposed or promotes peace if it ceases to try and stop Hamas. Look at it from their point of view - the period after Oslo seems to have been pretty violent against them.

    1. There have been people who opposed the state of Israel and haven't accepted its legitimacy from the start
  • I really think you need to read deeper. I apologise that this is ad hominem, but you don't seem to have a good grasp on the history of either side.

    1. Formation of Hamas:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hamas#History

      The idea of Hamas began to take form on December 10, 1987, when several members of the Brotherhood[h] convened the day after an incident in which an Israeli army truck had crashed into a car at a Gaza checkpoint killing 4 Palestinian day-workers.... To many Palestinians it appeared to engage more authentically with their national expectations, since it merely provided an Islamic version of what had been the PLO's original goals, armed struggle to liberate all of Palestine, rather than the territorial compromise the PLO acquiesced in—a small fragment of Mandatory Palestine.... entity distinct from the Muslim Brotherhood was a matter of practicality; the Muslim Brotherhood refused to engage in violence against Israel.

    2. The opposition to the formation of Israel and the basis of Israeli military policy.
      The creation of the IDF stemmed from this period
      Violence against Jews and Arabs was plentiful, and no side (especially the British) come out looking particularly good.
      Israel, much like the US, has a remnant believe (understandable from Israel, less so from the states) that they are under attack or at war. As such, your points are fine- but know the underlying basis.

    There used to be a good textbook on the conflict published in 1998.
    Subsequent revisions have fallen increasingly foul of partisan bias, whereas at least the first edition bias was predominantly pro-Britain.

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