Oh, and if you're wondering whether air gapping always makes security work easy... nope. Sometimes malware communicates via the microphone and speaker! Or by ambient light sensors. But it pushes the class of malware firmly into state actor territory. Additionally there's always the Stuxnet "let's load a USB file with the virus" method, etc, or "let's infect the BIOS or something low level and then infect USB devices which carry it elsewhere" and so on.
Air gapping isn't perfect from a security perspective. Clean devices, working in clean rooms, and investigating the virus from first principles is the way to go here.
When we need to send a malware sample from one person to another we can’t use a work system as it’ll be identified and quarantined. This can’t be turned off, and works across every platform that we could use to share a file that is provided by work. So we use Gmail to email it, which works fine.
Oh, and if you're wondering whether air gapping always makes security work easy... nope. Sometimes malware communicates via the microphone and speaker! Or by ambient light sensors. But it pushes the class of malware firmly into state actor territory. Additionally there's always the Stuxnet "let's load a USB file with the virus" method, etc, or "let's infect the BIOS or something low level and then infect USB devices which carry it elsewhere" and so on.
Air gapping isn't perfect from a security perspective. Clean devices, working in clean rooms, and investigating the virus from first principles is the way to go here.