• Thus far I have assumed that our Parliament, whenever it passes legislation, intends to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty. If the time should come when our Parliament deliberately passes an Act with the intention of repudiating the Treaty or any provision in it or intentionally of acting inconsistently with it and says so in express terms then I should have thought that it would be the duty of our courts to follow the statute of our Parliament. I do not however envisage any such situation. As I said in Blackburn v Attorney General ([1971] 2 All ER 1380 at 1383, [1971] 1 WLR 1037 at 1040): 'But if Parliament should do so, then I say we will consider that event when it happens.' Unless there is such an intentional and express repudiation of the Treaty, it is our duty to give priority to the Treaty. In the present case I assume that the United Kingdom intended to fulfil its obligations under art 119.

    My point is that the integration of EU law in UK law was never straightforward. Never just details.

  • But do you understand the central tenant of dammit's argument?

    That by both being able to agree to be bound by EU law, and by being able to rescind that agreement you prove that the British Parliament is supreme?

    The secondary element is that when the UK was part of the decision making process as a member of the EU it was still making law to bind itself.

    Now for all practical purposes while we can choose not to be bound by EU law, we still are.

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